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Progress in measuring governance is assessed using a simple framework that
distinguishes between indicators that measure formal rules and indicators that measure
the practical application or outcomes of these rules. The analysis calls attention to the
strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities
between them. It distinguishes between the views of experts and the results of surveys
and assesses the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators.
Some simple principles are identified to guide the use and refinement of existing govern-
ance indicators and the development of future indicators. These include transparently dis-
closing and accounting for the margins of error in all indicators, drawing from a
diversity of indicators and exploiting complementarities among them, submitting all
indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny, and being realistic in expectations of
future indicators. JEL codes: H1, O17
Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that
counts can be counted. —Albert Einstein
Most scholars, policymakers, aid donors, and aid recipients recognize that good
governance is a fundamental ingredient of sustained economic development. This
growing understanding, initially informed by a very limited set of empirical
measures of governance, has spurred intense interest in developing more refined,
nuanced, and policy-relevant indicators of governance. This article reviews
progress in measuring governance, emphasizing empirical measures explicitly
designed to be comparable across countries and in most cases over time. The goal
is to provide a structure for thinking about the strengths and weaknesses of
different types of governance indicators that can inform both the use of existing
indicators and ongoing efforts to improve them and develop new ones.1
The first section of this article reviews definitions of governance. Although there
are many broad definitions of governance, the degree of definitional disagreement
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can easily be overstated. Most definitions appropriately emphasize the importance
of a capable state that is accountable to citizens and operating under the rule of
law. Broad principles of governance along these lines are naturally not amenable to
direct observation and thus to direct measurement. As Albert Einstein noted, “Not
everything that counts can be counted.” Many different types of data provide infor-
mation on the extent to which these principles of governance are observed across
countries. An important corollary is that any particular indicator of governance
can usefully be interpreted as an imperfect proxy for some unobserved broad
dimension of governance. This interpretation emphasizes throughout this review a
recurrent theme that there is measurement error in all governance indicators,
which should be explicitly considered when using these kinds of data to draw
conclusions about cross-country differences or trends in governance over time.
The second section addresses what is measured. The discussion highlights the
distinction between indicators that measure specific rules “on the books” and indi-
cators that measure particular governance outcomes “on the ground.” Rules on
the books codify details of the constitutional, legal, or regulatory environment;
the existence or absence of specific agencies, such as anticorruption commissions
or independent auditors; and so forth—components intended to provide the key
de jure foundations of governance. On-the-ground measures assess de facto govern-
ance outcomes that result from the application of these rules (Do firms find the
regulatory environment cumbersome? Do households believe the police are
corrupt?). An important message in this section concerns the shared limitations
of indicators of both rules and outcomes: Outcome-based indicators of governance
can be difficult to link back to specific policy interventions, and the links from
easy-to-measure de jure indicators of rules to governance outcomes of interest are
not yet well understood and in some cases appear tenuous at best. They remind
us of the need to respect Einstein’s dictum that “not everything that can be
counted counts.”
The third section examines whose views should be relied on. Indicators based
on the views of various types of experts are distinguished from survey-based indi-
cators that capture the views of large samples of firms and individuals. A category
of aggregate indicators that combine, organize, provide structure, and summarize
information from these different types of respondents is examined. The fourth
section examines the rationale for such aggregate indicators, and their strengths
and weaknesses.
The set of indicators discussed in this survey is intended to provide leading
examples of major governance indicators rather than an exhaustive stocktaking of
existing indicators in this taxonomy.2 A feature of efforts to measure governance
is the preponderance of indicators focused on measuring de facto governance out-
comes and the paucity of measures of de jure rules. Almost by necessity, de jure
rules-based indicators of governance reflect the views or judgments of experts. In
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contrast, the much larger body of de facto indicators captures the views of both
experts and survey respondents.
The article concludes with a discussion of the way forward in measuring govern-
ance in a manner that can be useful to policymakers. The emphasis is on the
importance of consumers and producers of governance indicators clearly recogniz-
ing and disclosing the pervasive measurement error in any type of governance indi-
cators. This section also notes the importance of moving away from oft-heard false
dichotomies, such as “subjective” or “objective” indicators or aggregate or disaggre-
gated ones. For good reason, virtually all measures of governance involve a degree
of subjective judgment, and different levels of aggregation are appropriate for differ-
ent types of analysis. In any case, the choice is not either one or the other, as most
aggregate indicators can readily be unbundled into their constituent components.
What Does Governance Mean?
The concept of governance is not a new one. Early discussions go back to at least
400 BCE, to the Arthashastra, a treatise on governance attributed to Kautilya,
thought to be the chief minister to the king of India. Kautilya presents key pillars
of the “art of governance,” emphasizing justice, ethics, and anti-autocratic ten-
dencies. He identifies the duty of the king to protect the wealth of the state and its
subjects and to enhance, maintain, and safeguard this wealth as well as the inter-
ests of the kingdom’s subjects.
Despite the long provenance of the concept, no strong consensus has formed
around a single definition of governance or institutional quality. For this reason,
throughout this article the terms governance, institutions, and institutional quality
are used interchangeably, if somewhat imprecisely. Researchers and organizations
have produced a wide array of definitions. Some definitions are so broad that they
cover almost anything (such as the definition “rules, enforcement mechanisms,
and organizations” offered in the World Bank’s World Development Report 2002:
Building Institutions for Markets). Others, like the definition suggested by North
(2000), are not only broad but risk making the links from good governance to
development almost tautological: “How do we account for poverty in the midst of
plenty? . . . We must create incentives for people to invest in more efficient tech-
nology, increase their skills, and organize efficient markets . . . . Such incentives
are embodied in institutions.”
Some of the governance indicators surveyed capture a wide range of develop-
ment outcomes. While it is difficult to draw a line between governance and the
ultimate development outcomes of interest, it is useful at both the definitional and
measurement stages to emphasize concepts of governance that are at least some-
what removed from development outcomes themselves. An early and narrower
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definition of public sector governance proposed by the World Bank is that
“governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a
country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank 1992,
p. 1). This definition remains almost unchanged in the Bank’s 2007 governance
and anticorruption strategy, with governance defined as “the manner in which
public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public
policy and provide public goods and services” (World Bank 2007, p. 1).
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobato´n (1999a, p. 1) define governance as “the
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This
includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced;
the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions among them.”
Although the number of definitions of governance is large, there is some con-
sensus. Most definitions agree on the importance of a capable state operating
under the rule of law. Interestingly, comparing the last three definitions cited
above, the one substantive difference has to do with the explicit degree of empha-
sis on the role of democratic accountability of governments to their citizens. Even
these narrower definitions remain sufficiently broad that there is scope for a wide
diversity of empirical measures of various dimensions of good governance.
The gravity of the issues dealt with in these definitions of governance suggests
that measurement is important. In recent years there has been debate over whether
such broad notions of governance can be usefully measured. Many indicators can
shed light on various dimensions of governance. However, given the breadth of the
concepts, and in many cases their inherent unobservability, no single indicator or
combination of indicators can provide a completely reliable measure of any of these
dimensions of governance. Rather, it is useful to think of the various specific indi-
cators discussed below as all providing imperfect signals of fundamentally unobser-
vable concepts of governance. This interpretation emphasizes the importance of
taking into account as explicitly as possible the inevitable resulting measurement
error in all indicators of governance when analyzing and interpreting any such
measure. As shown below, however, the fact that such margins of error are finite
and still allow for meaningful country comparisons across space and time suggests
that measuring governance is both feasible and informative.
Governance Rules or Governance Outcomes?
This section examines both the rules-based and outcome-based indicators of gov-
ernance. A rules-based indicator of corruption might measure whether countries
have legislation prohibiting corruption or have an anticorruption agency.
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An outcome-based measure could assess whether the laws are enforced or the
anticorruption agency is undermined by political interference. The views of firms,
individuals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or commercial risk-rating
agencies could also be solicited regarding the prevalence of corruption in the
public sector. To measure public sector accountability, one could observe the rules
regarding the presence of formal elections, financial disclosure requirements for
public servants, and the like. One could also assess the extent to which these
rules operate in practice by surveying respondents regarding the functioning of
the institutions of democratic accountability.
Because a clear line does not always distinguish the two types of indicators, it
is more useful to think of ordering different indicators along a continuum, with
one end corresponding to rules and the other to ultimate governance outcomes of
interest. Because both types of indicators have their own strengths and weak-
nesses, all indicators should be thought of as imperfect, but complementary
proxies for the aspects of governance they purport to measure.
Rules-Based Indicators of Governance
Several rules-based indicators are used to assess governance (tables 1 and 2).
They include the Doing Business project of the World Bank, which reports
detailed information on the legal and regulatory environment in a large set of
countries; the Database of Political Institutions, constructed by World Bank
researchers, and the POLITY-IV database of the University of Maryland, both of
which report detailed factual information on features of countries’ political
systems; and the Global Integrity Index (GII), which provides detailed information
on the legal framework governing public sector accountability and transparency
in a sample of 41 countries, most of them developing economies.
At first glance, one of the main virtues of indicators of rules is their clarity. It is
straightforward to ascertain whether a country has a presidential or a parliamen-
tary system of government or whether a country has a legally independent anti-
corruption commission. In principle, it is also straightforward to document details
of the legal and regulatory environment, such as how many legal steps are
required to register a business or fire a worker. This clarity also implies that it is
straightforward to measure progress on such indicators. Has an anticorruption
commission been established? Have business entry regulations been streamlined?
Has a legal requirement for disclosure of budget documents been passed? This
clarity has made such indicators very appealing to aid donors interested in
linking aid with performance indicators and in monitoring progress on such
indicators. Set against these advantages are three main drawbacks.
They are less “objective” than they appear. It is easy to overstate the clarity and
objectivity of rules-based measures of governance. In practice, a good deal of
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subjective judgment is involved in codifying all but the most basic and obvious
features of a country’s constitutional, legal, and regulatory environments. (It is no
accident that the views of lawyers, on which many of these indicators are based,
are commonly referred to as opinions.) In Kenya in 2007, for example, a consti-
tutional right to access to information faced being undermined or offset entirely by
an official secrecy act and by pending approval and implementation of the Freedom
of Information Act. In this case, codifying even the legal right to access to infor-
mation requires careful judgment as to the net effect of potentially conflicting laws.
Of course, this drawback of ambiguity is not unique to rules-based measures of gov-
ernance: interpreting outcome-based indicators of governance can also involve
ambiguity, as discussed below. There has been less recognition, however, of the
extent to which rules-based indicators also reflect subjective judgment.
The links between indicators and outcomes are complex, possibly subject to long lags,
and often not well understood. These problems complicate the interpretation of
rules-based indicators. In the case of rules-based measures, some of the most
basic features of countries’ constitutional arrangements have little normative
content on their own; such indicators are for the most part descriptive. It makes
Table 1. Sources and Types of Information Used in Governance Indicators
Type of indicator
Source of information
Rules-based Outcomes-based
Broad Specific Broad Specific
Experts
Lawyers DB
Commercial risk-rating agencies DRI, EIU, PRS
Nongovernmental organizations GII HER, RSF, CIR, FRH GII, OBI
Governments and multilaterals CPIA PEFA
Academics DPI, PIV DPI, PIV
Survey respondents
Firms ICA, GCS, WCY
Individuals AFR, LBO, GWP
Aggregate indicators combining experts and survey respondents TI, WGI, MOI
Note: AFR is Afrobarometer, CIR is Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset, CPIA is Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment, DB is Doing Business, DPI is Database of Political Institutions, DRI is Global Insight
DRI, EIU is Economist Intelligence Unit, FRH is Freedom House, GCS is Global Competitiveness Survey, GII is
Global Integrity Index, GWP is Gallup World Poll, HER is Heritage Foundation, ICA is Investment Climate
Assessment, LBO is Latinobaro´metro, MOI is Ibrahim Index of African Governance, OBI is Open Budget Index,
PEFA is Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, PIV is Polity IV, PRS is Political Risk Services, RSF is
Reporters Without Borders, TI is Transparency International, WCY is World Competitiveness Yearbook, and WGI
is Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from sources listed in table 2.
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little sense, for example, to presuppose that presidential (as opposed to parliamentary)
systems or majoritarian (as opposed to proportional) representation in voting
arrangements are intrinsically good or bad. Interest in such variables as indi-
cators of governance rests on the case that they may matter for outcomes, often
in complex ways. In their influential book, Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini (2005)
document how these features of constitutional rules influence the political process
and ultimately outcomes such as the level, composition, and cyclicality of public
spending (Acemoglu 2006) challenges the robustness of these findings). In such
cases, the usefulness of rules-based indicators as measures of governance depends
crucially on how strong the empirical links are between such rules and the
ultimate outcomes of interest.
Perhaps the more common is the less extreme case in which rules-based indi-
cators of governance have normative content on their own, but the relative
Table 2. Country Coverage and Frequency of Governance Surveys
Name
Number of
countries covered
Frequency of
survey Web site
Afrobarometer 18 Triennial www.afrobarometer.org
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights
Dataset
192 Annual www.humanrightsdata.com
Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment
136 Annual www.worldbank.org
Doing Business 175 Annual www.doingbusiness.org
Database of Political Institutions 178 Annual http://econ.worldbank.org
Global Insight DRI 117 Quarterly www.globalinsight.com
Economist Intelligence Unit 120 Quarterly www.eiu.com
Freedom House 192 Annual www.freedomhouse.org
Global Competitiveness Survey 117 Annual www.weforum.org
Global Integrity Index 41 Triennial www.globalintegrity.org
Gallup World Poll 131 Annual www.gallupworldpoll.com
Heritage Foundation 161 Annual www.heritage.org
Investment Climate Assessment 94 Irregular www.investmentclimate.org
Latinobaro´metro 17 Annual www.latinobarometro.org
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 48 Triennial www.moibrahimfoundation.org
Open Budget Index 59 Annual www.openbudgetindex.org
Polity IV 161 Annual www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/
Political Risk Services 140 Monthly www.prsgroup.com
Public Expenditure and Financial
Accountability
42 Irregular www.pefa.org
Reporters without Borders 165 Annual www.rsf.org
World Competitiveness Yearbook 47 Annual www.imd.ch
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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importance of different rules for outcomes of interest is unclear. The GII, for
example, provides information on the existence of dozens of rules, ranging from
the legal right to freedom of speech to the existence of an independent ombuds-
man to the presence of legislation prohibiting the offering or acceptance of bribes.
The Open Budget Index (OBI) provides detailed information on the budget
processes, including the types of information provided in budget documents,
public access to budget documents, and the interaction between executive and
legislative branches in the budget process. Many of these indicators arguably have
normative value on their own: having public access to budget documents is desir-
able and having streamlined business registration procedures is better than not
having them.
This profusion of detail in rules-based indicators leads to two related difficulties
in using them to design and monitor governance reforms. The first is that as a
result of absence of good information on the links between changes in specific
rules or procedures and outcomes of interest, it is difficult to know which rules
should be reformed and in what order. Will establishing an anticorruption com-
mission or passing legislation outlawing bribery have any impact on reducing cor-
ruption? If so, which is more important? Should, instead, more efforts be put into
ensuring that existing laws and regulations are implemented or that there is
greater transparency, access to information, or media freedom? How soon should
one expect to see the impacts of these interventions? Given that governments typi-
cally operate with limited political capital to implement reforms, these trade-offs
and lags are important.
The second difficulty in designing or monitoring reforms arises when aid donors
or governments set performance indicators for governance reforms. Performance
indicators based on changing specific rules, such as the passage of a particular
piece of legislation or a reform of a specific budget procedure, can be very attractive
because of their clarity: it is straightforward to verify whether the specified policy
action has been taken.3 Yet “actionable” indicators are not necessarily also “action
worthy,” in the sense of having a significant impact on the outcomes of interest.
Moreover, excessive emphasis on registering improvements on rules-based indi-
cators of governance leads to risks of “teaching to the test” or, worse “reform illu-
sion,” in which specific rules or procedures are changed in isolation with the sole
purpose of showing progress on the specific indicators used by aid donors.
Major gaps exist between statutory rules on the books and their implementation on the
ground. To take an extreme example, in all 41 countries covered by the 2006 GII,
accepting a bribe is codified as illegal, and all but three countries (Brazil,
Lebanon, and Liberia) have anticorruption commissions or similar agencies. Yet
there is enormous variation in perceptions-based measures of corruption across
these countries. The 41 countries covered by the GII include the Democratic
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Republic of Congo, which ranks 200 out of 207 countries on the 2006
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) control of corruption indicator, and the
United States, which ranks 23.
Another example of the gap between rules and implementation (documented
in more detail in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005) compares the statutory
ease of establishing a business with a survey-based measure of firms’ perceptions
of the ease of starting a business across a large sample of countries. In industrial
countries, where de jure rules are often implemented as intended, the two
measures correspond quite closely. In contrast, in developing economies, where
there are often gaps between de jure rules and their de facto implementation, the
correlation between the two is very weak; the de jure codification of the rules and
regulations required to start a business is not a good predictor of the actual con-
straints reported by firms. Unsurprisingly, much of the difference between the
de jure and de facto measures could be statistically explained by de facto measures
of corruption, which subverts the fair application of rules on the books.
The three drawbacks—the inevitable role of judgment even in “objective” indi-
cators, the complexity and lack of knowledge regarding the links from rules to
outcomes of interest, and the gap between rules on the books and their
implementation on the ground—suggest that although rules-based governance
indicators provide valuable information, they are insufficient on their own for
measuring governance. Rules-based measures need to be complemented by and
used in conjunction with outcome-based indicators of governance.
Outcome-Based Governance Indicators
Most indicators of governance are outcome based, and several rules-based indi-
cators of governance also provide complementary outcome-based measures. The
GII, for example, pairs indicators of the existence of various rules and procedures
with indicators of their effectiveness in practice. The Database of Political
Institutions measures not only such constitutional rules as the presence of a par-
liamentary system, but also outcomes of the electoral process, such as the extent
to which one party controls different branches of government and the fraction of
votes received by the president. The Polity-IV database records a number of out-
comes, including the effective constraints on the power of the executive.
The remaining outcome-based indicators range from the highly specific to the
quite general. The OBI reports data on more than 100 indicators of the budget
process, ranging from whether budget documentation contains details of assump-
tions underlying macroeconomic forecasts to documentation of budget outcomes
relative to budget plans. Other less specific sources include the Public Expenditure
and Financial Accountability indicators, constructed by aid donors with inputs of
recipient countries, and several large cross-country surveys of firms—including
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the Investment Climate Assessments of the World Bank, the Executive Opinion
Survey of the World Economic Forum, and the World Competitiveness Yearbook of
the Institute for Management Development—that ask firms detailed questions
about their interactions with the state.
Examples of more general assessments of broad areas of governance include
ratings provided by several commercial sources, including Political Risk Services,
the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Global Insight–DRI. Political Risk Services
rates 10 areas that can be identified with governance, such as “democratic
accountability,” “government stability,” “law and order,” and “corruption.” Large
cross-country surveys of individuals such as the Afrobarometer and
Latinobaro´metro surveys and the Gallup World Poll ask general questions, such
as “Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this country?”
The main advantage of outcome-based indicators is that they capture the views
of relevant stakeholders, who take actions based on these views. Governments,
analysts, researchers, and decisionmakers should, and often do, care about public
views on the prevalence of corruption, the fairness of elections, the quality of
service delivery, and many other governance outcomes. Outcome-based govern-
ance indicators provide direct information on the de facto outcome of how de jure
rules are implemented.
Outcome-based measures also have some significant limitations. Such
measures, particularly where they are general, can be difficult to link back to
specific policy interventions that might influence governance outcomes. This is
the mirror image of the problem discussed above: Rules-based indicators of gov-
ernance can also be difficult to relate to outcomes of interest. A related difficulty
is that outcome-based governance indicators may be too close to ultimate develop-
ment outcomes of interest. To take an extreme example, the Ibrahim Index of
African Governance includes a number of ultimate development outcomes, such
as per capita GDP (gross domestic product), growth of GDP, inflation, infant mor-
tality, and inequality. While such development outcomes are surely worth moni-
toring, including them in an index of governance risks making the links from
governance to development tautological.
Another difficulty has to do with interpreting the units in which outcomes are
measured. Rules-based indicators have the virtue of clarity: either a particular
rule exists or it does not. Outcome-based indicators by contrast are often
measured on somewhat arbitrary scales. For example, a survey question might
ask respondents to rate the quality of public services on a five-point scale, with
the distinction between different scores left unclear and up to the respondent.4 In
contrast, the usefulness of outcome-based indicators is greatly enhanced by the
extent to which the criteria for differing scores are clearly documented. The World
Bank’s Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and the
Freedom House indicators are good examples of outcome-based indicators based
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on expert assessments that provide documentation of the criteria used to assign
specific scores on the indicators they compile. In the case of surveys, questions
can be designed to ensure that responses are easier to interpret: rather than
asking respondents whether they think “corruption is widespread,” respondents
can be asked whether they have been solicited for a bribe in the past month.
An example illustrates some of the main advantages and disadvantages of the
two types of measures. Figure 1 compares alternative indicators of democratic
accountability, a key dimension of governance. The horizontal axis measures a
very broad outcome-based indicator, taken from the 2005 Voice of the People
survey, a large cross-country household survey (www.voice-of-the-people.net). It
asks households to indicate whether they think elections in their country are free
and fair. The vertical axis reports two indicators of the quality of electoral insti-
tutions, taken from Global Integrity. The points labeled “de jure” are based on a
factual assessment of the existence of a number of specific institutions related to
Figure 1. De facto and de jure Indicators of Elections
Note: ARG is Argentina, ARM is Armenia, AZE is Azerbaijan, BEN is Benin, BRA is Brazil, BGR is Bulgaria,
ZAR is Democratic Republic of Congo, EGY is Egypt, ETH is Ethiopia, GEO is Georgia, GHA is Ghana, GTM is
Guatemala, IND is India, IDN is Indonesia, ISR is Israel, KEN is Kenya, KGZ is Kyrgyz Republic, LBN is Lebanon,
LBR is Liberia, MEX is Mexico, MNP is Montenegro, MOZ is Mozambique, NPL is Nepal, NIC is Nicaragua, NGA
is Nigeria, PAK is Pakistan, PHL is Philippines, ROM is Romania, RUS is Russia, SEN is Senegal, YUG is Serbia,
SLE is Sierra Leone, ZAF is South Africa, SDN is Sudan, TJK is Tajikistan, TZA is Tanzania, UGA is Uganda, USA
is United States, VNM is Vietnam, YEM is Yemen, and ZWE is Zimbabwe.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text.
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elections, such as the existence of a legal right to universal suffrage and the exist-
ence of an election monitoring agency. The points labeled “de facto” capture the
assessment of Global Integrity’s experts as to the effectiveness of these
institutions.5
Several messages emerge from this figure. First, in some cases rules-based
measures of governance show remarkably little variation across countries, with
all countries receiving scores close to 100, indicating perfect scores on the de jure
basis of this important aspect of governance. As of 2005, for example, every
country surveyed by Global Integrity promised the legal right to vote, and a statu-
torily independent election-monitoring agency existed in all but three countries
(Lebanon, Montenegro, and Mozambique). Second, the links between a specific
objective indicator of rules and the broad outcome of interest (citizens’ satisfaction
with elections) is at best very weak, with a correlation between the two measures
that is in fact slightly negative. Third, outcome-based indicators explicitly focusing
on the de facto implementation of rules can be useful. A noteworthy feature of
Global Integrity is its pairing of indicators of specific rules with assessments of
their functioning in practice. The correlation of the de facto measure with the
broad outcome measure of interest taken from the Voice of the People survey is
much stronger (0.46) than the correlation with the de jure measure. The corre-
lation is far from perfect, however, indicating the importance of relying on a
variety of indicators when assessing governance in a country.
Whose Views Should We Rely On?
A variety of governance assessments are produced by experts on behalf of com-
mercial risk-rating agencies and NGOs. The GII and the OBI, for example, rely on
locally recruited experts in each country to complete their detailed questionnaires
about governance, subject to peer review. Commercial organizations such as the
Economist Intelligence Unit rely on a network of local correspondents in a large
set of countries to provide information underlying the ratings they produce. Other
advocacy organizations, such as Amnesty International, Freedom House, and
Reporters without Borders, also rely on networks of respondents for the infor-
mation underlying their assessments.
Governments and multilateral organizations are also major producers of expert
assessments. Some of the most notable include the Country Policy and Institutional
Assessments, produced by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the
Asian Development Bank. Each of these assessments is based on the responses of
each institution’s country economists to a detailed questionnaire, responses that
are then reviewed for consistency and comparability across countries. The Public
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Expenditure and Financial Accountability indicators mentioned earlier are also
based on experts’ views.
Several large cross-country surveys of firms and individuals contain questions
on governance. These include the Investment Climate Assessment and
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys conducted by the
World Bank; the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum; the
World Competitiveness Yearbook; Voice of the People; and the Gallup World Poll.
Expert Assessments
Expert assessments have several major advantages, which account for their pre-
ponderance among various types of governance indicators. One is cost: it is much
less expensive to ask a selection of country economists at the World Bank to
provide responses to a questionnaire on governance as part of the CPIA process
than to carry out representative surveys of firms or households in a hundred or
more countries. The second advantage is that expert assessments can more
readily be tailored for cross-country comparability: Many of the organizations
listed in table 2 have elaborate benchmarking systems to ensure that scores are
comparable across countries. Finally, for certain aspects of governance experts are
the natural respondents for the type of information being sought. (Consider, for
example, the OBI’s detailed questionnaire on national budget processes, the par-
ticulars of which are not the sort of common knowledge that survey data can
easily collect.)
Expert assessments nevertheless have several important limitations. A basic
one is that, like survey respondents, different experts may have different views
about similar aspects of governance. While this is not surprising, it suggests that
users of governance indicators should be cautious about relying too heavily on
any one set of expert assessments. These differences are evident in comparing the
CPIA ratings of the World Bank and the African Development Bank, which in
recent years harmonized their procedures for constructing CPIA ratings. An iden-
tical questionnaire covering 16 dimensions of policy and institutional perform-
ance is completed by two very similar sets of expert respondents—country
economists with in-depth experience working on behalf of these two organizations
in the countries they are assessing. Despite the homogeneity of the respondents
and the very similar rating criteria, there are nontrivial differences between the
two organizations’ assessments on the 16 components of the CPIA (table 3). For
example, the 0.67 correlation between the two assessments on the question on
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector is far from
perfect, suggesting that it is prudent to base assessments of governance for policy
purposes on the views of a variety of expert assessments.6
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The second criticism that the country ratings assigned by different groups of
experts are too highly correlated is just the opposite. Suppose that one set of
experts comes up with an assessment of governance for a set of countries based
on its own independent research and the second set of experts simply reproduces
the assessments of the first. In this case, the high correlation of two expert assess-
ments cannot be interpreted as evidence of their accuracy. Rather, it would reflect
the fact that the two sources make correlated errors in measuring governance.7
Nevertheless, even if the errors made by two data sources are highly, but not
perfectly correlated, there will be benefits to relying on both data sources. The
important empirical question is whether this hypothetical correlation of errors
across sources is large or not. Empirically identifying correlations in errors across
sources is difficult. Simply observing whether the assessments provided in the two
data sources are highly correlated is not enough, as the high correlation can
reflect the fact that both sources are either measuring governance accurately or
making correlated measurement errors.
To make progress, one needs to make identifying assumptions. Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) detail two sets of assumptions that allow potential
sources of correlation in the errors to be disentangled. One is that surveys of firms
or individuals are less likely to make errors that are correlated with other data
sources than, for example, assessments by commercial risk-rating agencies. If this
is the case, however, one would expect that the assessments of commercial risk-
rating agencies would be very highly correlated with one another, but less so
with surveys. This turns out not to be the case. The average correlation of the five
Table 3. Correlation Among Alternative Indicators of Corruption
Expert assessments Surveys
Indicator
World
Bank
CPIA
African
Development
Bank CPIA
Global
Integrity
World Markets
Online
World Economic
Forum Executive
Opinion Survey
Gallup
World Poll
World Bank CPIA 1.00 0.67 0.30 0.56 0.25 0.13
African
Development Bank
CPIA
1.00 0.49 0.51 0.45 0.24
Global Integrity 1.00 0.34 0.29 0.11
World Markets
Online
1.00 0.88 0.59
World Economic
Forum Executive
Opinion Survey
1.00 0.70
Gallup World Poll 1.00
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text.
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major commercial risk-rating agencies for corruption in 2002–05 was 0.80. The
correlation of each of these assessments with a large cross-country survey of
firms was slightly higher (0.81), in contrast with what one would expect if the
rating agencies had correlated errors. Conducting this exercise across all six
aggregate governance indicators reveals at most modest evidence of error corre-
lation. While this is unlikely to be the final word on this important question, it is
a useful step forward to propose and implement tests of error correlation based on
explicit identifying assumptions.
The third criticism is that expert assessments are subject to various biases.
Some researchers claim that many of these sources are biased toward the views of
the business community, which may have very different views of what constitutes
good governance than do other types of respondents. In short, goes the critique,
businesspeople like low taxes and less regulation, while the public good demands
reasonable taxation and appropriate regulation. This critique does not seem
particularly compelling. If it were true, the responses of commercial risk-rating
agencies, which serve mostly business clients, or the views of firms themselves to
questions about governance, should not be highly correlated with ratings provided
by respondents who are more likely to sympathize with the common good, such
as individuals, NGOs, or public sector organizations. Yet, in most cases, these
correlations are strong (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007b). Cross-country
surveys of firms and of individuals, such as the World Economic Forum’s
Executive Opinion Survey and the Gallup World Poll, yield similar corruption
rankings, with the two surveys correlated at 0.7 (table 3).
Another potential source of bias in expert assessments, particularly those pro-
duced by NGOs, is that they are colored by the ideological orientation of the ratings
organization. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) find that the assessments of
think tanks and firm surveys are not systematically correlated with the political
orientation of a country’s government, casting doubt on this possible source of
bias. A potentially greater problem of bias is at the country respondent level. For
example, the views of pro-government and antigovernment “experts” might be
very different, affecting both levels and trends over time. This risk is perhaps great-
est for the sources that rely on local experts, such as the GII. This risk is also much
more difficult to test for systematically, as the biases may affect individual country
scores without introducing systematic biases into the source as a whole.
Nevertheless, careful comparisons of many different data sources can often turn up
anomalies in a single source that require more careful scrutiny.
Surveys of Firms and Individuals
Governance indicators derived from surveys of firms and individuals have the fun-
damental advantage that they elicit the views of the ultimate beneficiaries of good
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governance, citizens and firms in a country. The views of these stakeholders
matter because they are likely to act on those views. If firms or individuals believe
that the courts and the police are corrupt, they are unlikely to try to use their ser-
vices (Hellman and Kaufmann 2004). Individuals are less likely to vote or to hold
their elected leaders accountable if they think that elections are not free and fair.
Another advantage of governance indicators based on surveys of domestic firms
and individuals is greater domestic political credibility. Governments often dismiss
external expert assessments of governance as uninformed pontification by outsi-
ders. It is much harder for them to dismiss the views of their own citizens or of
firms operating in their country. Survey-based data on governance can therefore
be particularly useful in galvanizing the politics of governance reforms. The
experience of many countries implementing their own in-depth Governance and
Anti-Corruption diagnostics (assisted by the World Bank Institute and other
agencies and implemented with institutions in the requesting country), based on
in-country surveys of enterprises, users of services, and public officials, supports
this point: the views expressed by thousands of domestic stakeholders provide
powerful input for action to reformist policymakers and civil society groups.
Set against these important advantages of surveys are a number of disadvan-
tages. First, there is the usual array of potential problems with any type of survey
data, ranging from issues of sampling design to issues of nonresponse bias. Expert
assessments, which are based on the views of a very small number of respondents,
are less likely to be representative of the population of firms or households.8
While these generic issues are important for all surveys, the focus here is on diffi-
culties specific to measuring governance using survey data.
Some survey questions on governance can be vague and open to interpretation.
An interesting example comes from the innovative recent work by Razafindrakoto
and Roubaud (2006). They use specially designed surveys in eight African
countries to contrast corruption perceptions based on household surveys with
those based on expert assessments. The unique feature of this exercise is that the
experts were asked to predict the country-level average responses from the house-
hold survey. Experts’ ratings were essentially uncorrelated with the household
survey responses. The authors conclude that the household surveys capture the
“objective reality” of petty corruption and that the experts are just plain wrong.
Their interpretation that there is measurement error only in the expert assess-
ment and not in the household survey is contestable. Households were asked
whether they had been “victims of corruption.” There are a variety of reasons why
households might falsely think they were victimized by corruption. For example, a
patient waiting in line to see a state-provided doctor might think (incorrectly) that
people at the head of the line had bribed someone to get there. Conversely, house-
holds might well have paid a bribe, received the associated benefit, and found them-
selves quite satisfied and not at all “victimized” by the transaction. A more modest
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interpretation of their finding is that there likely is measurement error in both the
household survey and the matching expert assessments. Moreover, in many other
cases, expert assessments and household survey responses are strongly correlated
across much larger samples of countries.
Well-designed survey questions on corruption have become increasingly specific.
For example, questions in the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic
Forum in some years have asked firms to specifically report the fraction of contract
value solicited in bribes on public procurement contracts. Greater attention is also
being paid to techniques that enable respondents to report more truthfully to sensitive
questions. For example, questions about corruption put to firms are often prefaced by
“in your experience, do firms like your own typically pay bribes for . . . .?” Innovative
techniques such as randomized response methods are used to protect the confidenti-
ality of individual responses by allowing respondents to “camouflage” their response
to sensitive questions by generating some of their responses at random based on the
outcome of a coin toss, although these methods have not yet been widely used in
large cross-country surveys.9 A related concern has to do with surveys in authoritar-
ian countries, where respondents might legitimately be fearful of responding truth-
fully to any question that might be interpreted as critical of the government.
Another potential difficulty in cross-country surveys is cultural bias. It is often
argued that because respondents in different countries may have different norms
regarding what does or does not constitute corruption, their responses are not com-
parable across countries. Presumably, however, these cultural biases should not be
present in cross-country expert assessments that are deliberately designed to be
comparable across countries. Moreover, in many cases it turns out that surveys and
expert assessments tend to produce very similar cross-country rankings. Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) document strong correlations between expert assess-
ments and the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey for six different
dimensions of governance. A glance at table 3 provides similar examples: the cross-
country correlation between the corruption assessments of World Markets Online,
a commercial rating agency, and the Executive Opinion Survey is 0.88. While
culture undoubtedly matters in interpreting survey responses across countries, the
problem does not appear to be a first-order difficulty.
In short, each type of data has its own strengths and weaknesses. As neither
type of respondent is clearly superior for all purposes, it important to rely on a
diversity of data sources.
Should Aggregate or Individual Indicators Be Used?
Does it make sense to combine individual indicators of governance into aggregate
or composite indicators by combining information from multiple sources? Table 1
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includes three aggregate indicators, the WGI, the Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI) of Transparency International, and the very recently released Ibrahim Index
of African Governance.
The WGI consist of six aggregate indicators of governance covering more than
200 countries and combining cross-country data on governance provided by 30
organizations. The CPI measures only corruption, using a smaller set of data
drawn from nine organizations. The WGI control of corruption indicator uses
these nine data sources, as well as 13 others not used in the CPI. The Ibrahim
Index is an extremely broad collection of a variety of types of governance indi-
cators and several very broad development outcomes, including per capita
income, growth, inequality, and poverty. This makes the Ibrahim Index by far the
broadest indicator surveyed here, but it also makes it difficult to think of it as a
pure governance indicator, because it contains many development outcomes as
well. However, three of the five components of the Ibrahim Index—based primarily
on subjective governance measures, such as those used by Transparency
International and the WGI—correspond more closely to established notions of
governance.
Ubiquitous Measurement Error
All governance indicators have limitations, which make them imperfect proxies
for the concepts they are intended to measure. The presence of measurement
error in all governance indicators that this implies is central to the rationale for
constructing aggregate indicators. It is useful to distinguish between two broad
types of measurement error that affect all types of governance indicators.
Any specific governance indicator will have measurement error relative to the
concept it seeks to measure, because of intrinsic measurement challenges.
A survey question about corruption, for example, will have the usual sampling
error associated with it. Efforts to objectively document the specifics of the insti-
tutional environment or regulatory regime face challenges in coming up with a
factually accurate description of the relevant laws and regulations in each setting.
Measures of the composition and volatility of public spending, for example, which
are sometimes interpreted as indicators of undesirable policy instability, are
subject to all of the usual difficulties in measuring public spending consistently
across countries and over time. Finally, different groups of experts may come up
with different assessments of the same phenomenon in a particular country.
These divergences of opinion can also be interpreted as measurement error.
To the extent that one is interested in broad concepts of governance, any
specific indicator is almost by definition an imperfect measure of the broader con-
cepts to which it pertains, no matter how accurate or reliable it is. A specific
assessment of corruption in public procurement would not be fully informative
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about overall corruption in the public sphere even if it were fully accurate about
this specific type of corruption. Information about the statutory requirements for
business entry regulation need not reflect the actual practice of how these
requirements are implemented on the ground, and they are not informative about
regulatory burdens in other areas. Information about freedom of the press is only
one of many factors contributing to the accountability of governments to their
citizens. Notwithstanding some clear advantages that specificity of an indicator
may have for some purposes, one should be careful not to interpret them as suffi-
cient statistics for broader notions of governance.
How important is this measurement error? Unfortunately, the vast majority of
governance indicators do not explicitly acknowledge the extent of measurement
error. One of the few exceptions is the WGI, discussed below. Fortunately, some
simple calculations can shed light on the likely magnitude of measurement error
in individual governance indicators as well. The key to doing so is to identify pairs
of indicators that measure similar concepts, up to an unavoidable measurement
error component. A useful way to interpret the imperfect correlation between the
World Bank’s CPIA and African Development Bank’s CPIA regarding transpar-
ency and corruption is to note that both are measuring the same concept of
transparency and corruption but with a degree of measurement error. Intuitively,
the less measurement error there is in these two sources, the more correlated
they should be. Thus one can interpret the correlation between them as saying
something about the degree of measurement error present.
More formally, think of the observed scores from two organizations, y1 and y2,
as a combination of a signal of unobserved governance, g, and source-specific
noise, 11 and 12 (that is, y1 ¼ g þ 11 and y2 ¼ g þ 12). Assume that the variance
of measurement error in the assessments of the two organizations is the same,
and without loss of generality, that the variance of governance is one.10 Some
simple arithmetic reveals that the standard deviation of measurement error is
SD(1) ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃð1  rÞ=rp , where r is the correlation between the two expert assess-
ments.11 For several pairs of indicators discussed in the article, this standard devi-
ation of error ranges from 0.70 to 1.53 (table 4). The standard errors associated
with standard deviation of error indicators such as the WGI are much smaller,
reflecting the benefits of aggregation in reducing noise in the individual indi-
cators. The standard error for the WGI estimate of control of corruption for a
typical country in 2006 is just 0.17, or less than a quarter of the standard error
of the most precise pair of individual indicators in this example.
To appreciate the magnitude of this measurement error, it is useful to go one
step further and calculate the width of a 90 percent confidence interval for gov-
ernance based on any one of these individual indicators and on the additional
assumption that governance and the error term are jointly normally distributed.
The width of the confidence interval is 2x1.64xSD(g|y) ¼ 3.28x ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1  pp .
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Since the assumptions imply that 95 percent of countries would have governance
levels between –2 and 2, these figures imply that a 90 percent confidence interval
for governance for any individual country would span one-half to two-thirds of
the entire most likely range of the governance indicator.
Why Aggregate Indicators?
All indicators of governance include measurement error. Aggregate indicators of
governance can be a useful way of combining, organizing, and summarizing infor-
mation from different sources, thereby reducing the influence of measurement
error in any individual indicator. Aggregation also allows for the construction of
explicit margins of error for both the aggregate indicator and its component indi-
vidual indicators.
The WGI illustrate how these margins of error can be calculated (box 1). The
statistical methodology underpinning the WGI (the unobserved-components
model) explicitly assumes that the true level of governance is unobservable and
that the observed empirical indicators of governance provide imperfect signals of
the fundamentally unobservable concept of governance. This formalizes the
notion that all available indicators are imperfect proxies for governance. The esti-
mates of governance that come out of this model are simply the conditional
expectation of governance in each country, conditioning on the observed data for
each country. Moreover, the unobserved-components model allows one to sum-
marize uncertainty about these estimates for each country with the standard
deviation of unobserved governance, conditional on the observed data. These
standard deviations can be used to construct confidence intervals for governance
estimates, often referred to informally as margins of error. Intuitively, the larger
the number of data sources available for a given country, the smaller these
Table 4. Measurement Error in Individual Governance Indicators
Measure Correlation
Standard deviation
of error
Width of
confidence interval
Transparency, accountability, and corruption
World Bank CPIA-16
African Development Bank CPIA-16
0.67 0.70 1.88
Business entry regulation
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey
Doing Business
0.48 1.04 2.37
Elections
Global Corruption Barometer Survey
Global Integrity Elections Index
0.30 1.53 2.74
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text.
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margins of error should be. The variance of the error term can be estimated
in each individual underlying governance indicator using this methodology,
following a calculation that generalizes the simple one discussed above.
Box 1. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Critiques and Responses
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are among the most widely used cross-country governance
indicators (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007a for a description). They report on six dimensions
of governance for more than 200 countries for 1996–2006. The indicators are based on hundreds of
underlying individual indicators drawn from 30 organizations, based on responses from tens of
thousands of citizens, enterprise managers, and experts.
As one of the most prominent and widely used collections of cross-country governance indicators, the
WGI have naturally generated criticism. Most of these criticisms appear largely invalid (Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi 2007b).
Lack of Comparability over Time and across Countries
Several critics have raised concerns that the WGI are not comparable over time and across countries, that
the indicators use units that set the global average of governance to be identical in all periods, that
comparisons of pairs of countries or single countries over time are based on different sets of underlying
data sources, and that there are substantial margins of error in the aggregate WGI.
These criticisms appear unjustified, for several reasons. First, there is no clear evidence of a trend in
one direction or another in global averages of governance in any of the underlying individual data
sources (the overall evidence pointing to general stagnation). The choice of a constant global average is
therefore no more than an innocuous choice of units. Second, changes in the set of underlying data
sources on average contributes only minimally to changes over time in countries’ scores on the aggregate
WGI; the majority of cross-country comparisons using the aggregate WGI are based on a substantial
number of common data sources. Third, the presence of explicit margins of error in the WGI is an
important advantage, serving as a useful antidote to superficial comparisons of country ranks or country
performance over time that are often made with other governance indicators. A substantial fraction of
cross-country and over-time comparisons using the WGI result in statistically significant differences,
suggesting that the WGI are informative.
Biases in Expert Assessments
Several critics have alleged various biases in the data sources underlying the WGI, including an
excessive emphasis on business-friendly regulation on the part of some data providers; ideological biases,
such as a bias against left-wing governments, on the part of some data providers; and “halo effects,”
whereby countries with good economic performance receive better-than-warranted governance scores.
Convincing empirical evidence in support of such biases has not been provided. Empirical work by
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (discussed in the main text) suggests that these biases are quantitatively
unimportant.
Correlated Perception Errors
Several critics have suggested that expert assessments make similar errors when assessing the same
country, leading to correlations in the perception errors across expert assessments. While this is plausible,
there is little convincing empirical evidence; work by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (discussed below)
suggests that these biases are quantitatively unimportant.
(Continued)
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Box 1. Continued
A related concern is that correlated perception errors will lead to the overweighting of such sources in
the aggregate WGI, which weights individual data sources by estimates of their precision, which in turn
are based on the observed intercorrelation among sources. Given the at best modest evidence of
correlated perceptions errors, this is unlikely to be quantitatively important. The WGI country rankings
are highly robust to alternative weighting schemes (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006).
Definitional Issues
Some critics have taken issue with the definitions of governance and thus the assignment of individual
governance indicators to the six aggregate WGI. As there is no consensus on the definition of
governance, there cannot be any right or wrong definitions or corresponding measures of governance.
That said, most reasonable definitions of governance cover similar broad areas, and aggregate indicators
capturing these broad areas are likely to be similar. Moreover, as virtually all of the individual indicators
underlying the WGI are publicly available on the WGI Web site, researchers can easily construct
alternative indicators corresponding to their preferred notions of governance.
Reliance on “Subjective” Data
Various critics have argued that the perceptions-based data on which the WGI are based do no more
than reflect vague and generic perceptions rather than specific objective realities and that “specific,
objective, and actionable” measures of governance are needed to make progress in governance reforms.
Virtually all governance indicators necessarily involve some element of subjectivity. Perceptions-based
data are extremely valuable, because they capture the views of relevant stakeholders who act on these
views. Moreover, the links from specific changes to policy rules are very difficult to link to changes in
outcomes of interest, making it is difficult to identify indicators that are “action worthy” as opposed to
merely “actionable.”
From the standpoint of users the margins of error associated with estimates of
governance are nontrivial. For many pairs of countries with similar scores on the
2006 WGI control of corruption indicator, the confidence intervals overlap, indi-
cating that the small differences between them are unlikely to be statistically, or
practically, significant (figure 2). However, possible pair-wise comparisons
between countries do result in significant differences. Roughly two-thirds of the
possible pair-wise comparisons of corruption across countries result in differences
that are significant at the 90 percent confidence level, and nearly three-quarters
of comparisons are significant at the 75 percent confidence level. Clearly, far
fewer pair-wise comparisons would be significant if they were based on any single
individual indicator, whose margins of error had not been reduced by averaging
across alternative data sources. For the WGI control of corruption indicator, for
example, only 16 percent of cross-country comparisons based on a typical indi-
vidual data source, such as Global Insight-DRI, would be significant at the
90 percent confidence level.
The WGI are unusual among governance indicators in their transparent recog-
nition of such margins of error. The vast majority of investment climate and gov-
ernance indicators simply report country scores or ranks, without quantifying the
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measurement error these rankings inevitably contain. This has contributed to a
spurious sense of precision among users of these indicators and to an overempha-
sis on small differences across countries.
Of course, aggregate indicators have their own shortcomings. Foremost
among them is the inevitable loss of specificity. Averaging one indicator of judicial
corruption and another indicator of bureaucratic corruption arguably yields a
more informative indicator of overall corruption, but not necessarily a more
informative indicator of either of the two specific types of corruption. Averaging
an indicator of freedom of the press with an indicator of electoral integrity
yields a more informative indicator of overall democratic accountability, but not
of either particular concept. For some purposes the broad aggregate indicators
will be useful; for others the disaggregated indicators will be more useful. This
is not a shortcoming, however, because virtually all aggregate governance
indicators can readily be disaggregated into their constituent components, giving
the user the freedom to choose the appropriate level of aggregation for the task
at hand.12
Figure 2. Margins of Error in Estimates of Governance in Selected Countries, 2006
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi. 2007a.
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The second concern with aggregate indicators is that their effectiveness at
reducing measurement error depends crucially on the extent to which their
underlying sources provide independent information on governance. Some types
of expert assessments may make correlated errors in their governance rankings
(although empirical evidence suggests that these error correlations are not likely
to be very large). Aggregate indicators can mitigate only the component of
measurement error that is truly independent across the different underlying indi-
cators. This point is particularly relevant when contrasting multiple- and single-
source aggregate indicators.
The WGI are multiple-source aggregate indicators, combining information from
a large number of sources. In contrast, many other data sources report aggregates
of their own subcomponents. For example, there is an aggregate CPIA rating in
conjunction with the 16 underlying components, and there are six aggregate
Global Integrity indicators, which combine information from more than 200
underlying individual indicators. All of the underlying individual indicators for a
given country are scored by the same respondents. As a result, any respondent-
specific biases are likely to be reflected in all of the individual indicators; the gain
in precision from relying on the aggregate indicators from these sources will not
be as large as when aggregate indicators are based on multiple sources.
In summary, aggregate governance indicators can play a useful role in synthe-
sizing and summarizing the large variety of individual governance indicators.
Using aggregate indicators is one way to exploit the complementarities between
the different types of indicators (rules or outcomes, surveys or experts).
Aggregation can also increase the precision with which these aggregate indicators
measure broad but unobservable concepts of governance. Of course, for some pur-
poses, more specific indicators are useful. It is thus important to be able to easily
disaggregate aggregate indicators into their constituent components, as is the
case with the WGI.
Moving Forward
A sobering picture emerges from this review: while most indicators of governance
have many virtues, all face distinct challenges. Researchers, therefore, need to
look at a variety of indicators and sources when monitoring or assessing govern-
ance across countries, within a country, or over time. A few principles may be
useful as this work, as the use of governance indicators in public sector policy-
making and civil society monitoring, continues.
Avoid false dichotomies. Too often, discussions of governance indicators over-
emphasize distinctions between types of governance indicators, with insufficient
regard for the strong complementarities between them. Artificially, sharp
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distinctions are often drawn between “subjective” and “objective” indicators of
governance, when, in fact, virtually all indicators of governance rely on the
judgments or perceptions of respondents in one way or another. In some cases,
even the terminology is misleading. The recently released Ibrahim Index of
African Governance, for example, touts itself as providing objective assessments of
governance, even though its core governance components are based primarily on
purely subjective data, including the Transparency International CPI and subjec-
tive ratings by the Heritage Foundation and the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Distinctions between aggregated and disaggregated indicators often have an
artificial element also. Some aggregate indicators transparently disclose each dis-
aggregated source, enabling users to take advantage of the complementarities
between the two types of indicators and blurring the distinction between the two.
For some purposes, it is useful to combine information from many individual indi-
cators into some kind of summary statistics, while, for other purposes, the disag-
gregated data are of primary interest. Even where disaggregated data are of
primary interest, however, it is important to rely on a number of independent
sources for validation, because the margins of error and the likelihood of extreme
outliers are significantly higher for a disaggregated indicator.
An excessively narrow emphasis on “actionable” indicators detailing specific
policy interventions immediately under the control of governments can divert
attention from equally important discussions of which of these indicators are
“action worthy,” in the sense of having significant impacts on outcomes of inter-
est. The answer is often context-specific and rarely obvious a priori. Focusing too
much on “actionable” indicators while downplaying scrutiny of outcome indi-
cators may result in undue emphasis on measures that may not translate into
concrete progress.
Use indicators appropriate for the task at hand. As with all tools, different types of
indicators are suited for different purposes. Governance indicators can be used for
regular cross-country comparisons. While many of these indicators have become
increasingly specific, they often remain blunt tools for monitoring governance and
studying the causes and consequences of good governance at the country level.
For these purposes, a wide variety of innovative tools and methods of analysis has
been deployed in many countries (reviewing these methods is beyond the scope of
this survey). Examples of in-country tools include the World Bank’s Investment
Climate Assessments, the World Bank Institute’s Governance and Anti-Corruption
diagnostics, the corruption surveys conducted by some chapters of Transparency
International, and the institutional scorecard carried out by the Public Affairs
Center in Bangalore, India. Many project-specific interventions and diagnostics
are possible to measure governance at this level.13
Public and professional scrutiny is essential for the credibility of governance indi-
cators. Virtually all of the governance indicators listed in table 2 are publicly
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available, either commercially or at no cost to users. This transparent feature is
central to their credibility for monitoring governance. Open availability permits
broad scrutiny and public debate about the content and methodology of indi-
cators and their implications for individual countries. Many indicators are also
produced by nongovernmental actors, making it more likely that they are
immune from either the perception or the reality of self-interested manipulation
on the part of the government. Scholarly peer review can also strengthen the
quality and credibility of governance indicators. For example, articles describing
the methodology of the Doing Business indicators, the Database of Political
Institutions, and the WGI have appeared in peer-reviewed professional journals.
Transparency with respect to details of methodology and its limitation is also
essential for credible use of governance indicators. It is important that users of
governance indicators understand fully the characteristics of the indicators they
are using, including any methodological changes over time and time lags
between the collection of data and publication.
It is thus of concern that some proposed and existing indicators of governance
are insufficiently open to public scrutiny. While the recent disclosure of the World
Bank’s CPIA ratings for low-income countries represents a positive step, these
indicators are being disclosed for only about half of the roughly 130 countries for
which they are prepared each year, and none of the historical data from 2005 or
earlier are publicly available. Historical data on the CPIA ratings of the African
Development Bank and Asian Development Bank have also not been disclosed
publicly. This is unfortunate, given that the decision to selectively disclose recent
CPIA data and not to disclose historical CPIA data is made by the executive
boards of these organizations and therefore reflects the desire of the very govern-
ments these ratings are supposed to assess. Regarding transparency, it is also of
concern that although the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
initiative has been ongoing since 2000, it had resulted in indicators and reports
on just 42 countries as of March 2007, for only one period per country, only nine
of them publicly available. Moreover, because these reports are prepared in collab-
oration with the governments in question, their credibility may not be the same
as those associated with third-party indicators. Similar concerns affect recent
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development-led efforts to construct
indicators of public procurement practices.
Transparently acknowledge margins of error of all governance indicators. All govern-
ance indicators include measurement error and so should be thought of as imper-
fect proxies for the fundamentals of good governance. This is not just an abstract
statistical point, but rather one of fundamental importance for all users of govern-
ance indicators. Wherever possible, such margins of error should be explicitly
acknowledged, as they are in the WGI, and taken seriously when the indicators
are used to monitor progress on governance. At times the lack of disclosure of
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margins of error is rationalized by suggesting that they would be missed by most
readers. Experience with the WGI suggests that this is not the case, with many
users recognizing and benefiting from this additional degree of transparency
about data limitations.
Exploit the wealth of available indicators, recognizing that progress in developing new
indicators is likely to be incremental. Much more work needs to be done to exploit
the large body of disaggregated measures of governance already in existence.
Linking disaggregated indicators to disaggregated outcomes, both across countries
and over time, is likely to be an important area of research over the next several
years that is likely to have important implications for policymakers.
There is also scope for developing new and better indicators of governance.
Work to improve such indicators will be important, as indicators are increasingly
used to monitor the success and failure of governance reform efforts. But given
the many challenges of measuring governance, it is important to recognize that
progress in this area over the next several years is likely to be incremental rather
than fundamental. Alongside efforts to develop new indicators, there is also a
case to improve existing indicators, particularly in increasing the periodicity of
heretofore one-off efforts and in broadening their country coverage (covering
industrial and developing economies), as well as covering issues for which data
are still scarce, such as money laundering.
Notes
Daniel Kaufmann is a director of global programs at the World Bank Institute; his email address is
dkaufmann@worldbank.org. Aart Kraay is a lead economist in the Development Research Group at
the World Bank; his email address is akraay@worldbank.org. The authors would like to thank
Shanta Devarajan for encouraging them to write this survey, Simeon Djankov and three anonymous
referees for their helpful comments, and Massimo Mastruzzi for assistance.
1. For surveys of and user guides to governance indicators, see UNDP (2005), Arndt and Oman
(2006), and Knack (2006). Because of space constraints, no attempt is made here to review the
important body of work focused on in-depth within-country diagnostic measures of governance that
are not designed for cross-country replicability and comparisons.
2. A fuller compilation of governance datasets is available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/govern-
ance/data.
3. Indeed, this is reflected in the terminology of “actionable” governance indicators emphasized
in the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report (World Bank 2006).
4. See King and Wand (2007) for a description of how this problem can be mitigated by the use
of “anchoring vignettes” that provide a common frame of reference to respondents in interpreting
the response scale. The basic idea is to provide an understandable anecdote or vignette describing
the situation faced by a hypothetical respondent to the survey. For example, “Miguel frequently finds
that his applications to renew a business license are rejected or delayed unless they are accompanied
by an additional payment of 1,000 pesos beyond the stated license fee.” Respondents are then asked
to assess how great corruption as an obstacle is for Miguel’s business, using a 10-point scale. Since
all respondents use the scale to assess the same situation, this rating can be used to “anchor” their
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responses to questions referring to their own situation.
5. These two indicators are measured as the average of 14 “in law” components and the 20 “in
practice” components of the elections indicator of Global Integrity.
6. Starting with the 2005 data, both the African Development Bank and the World Bank have
made their CPIA scores public. The African Development Bank does so for all borrowing countries;
the World Bank does so only for countries eligible for its most concessional lending.
7. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobato´n (1999a) show how the estimated margins of error of
their aggregate governance indicators would increase if they assume that the error terms made by
individual data sources were correlated. Recently, Svensson (2005), Arndt and Oman (2006), and
Knack (2006) have raised this criticism again, largely without the benefit of systematic evidence.
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007b) provide a detailed response.
8. This is not to say that all of the surveys used to measure governance are necessarily represen-
tative in any strict sense of the term. In fact, one general critique is that several large cross-country
surveys of firms that provide data on governance are not very clear about their sample frame and
sampling methodology. The Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum, for example,
states that it seeks to ensure that the sample of respondents is representative of the sectoral and size
distribution of firms (World Economic Forum 2006). But it reports that it “carefully select[s] compa-
nies whose size and scope of activities guarantee that their executives benefit from international
exposure” ( p. 133). It is not clear from their documentation how these two conflicting objectives are
reconciled.
9. A simple example is that respondents are asked whether they have ever offered a bribe. But
before answering, the respondent is instructed to privately toss a coin and to answer “yes” if
either they have in fact offered a bribe, or the coin comes up heads. See Azfar and Murrell (2006)
for an assessment of the extent to which randomized response methods correct for respondent
reticence and an innovative approach to using this methodology to weed out less than candid
respondents.
10. The assumption of a common error variance is necessary in this simple example with two
indicators in order to achieve identification. In this example, just one sample correlation in the
data can be used to infer the variance of measurement error; just one measurement error var-
iance can thus be identified. In more general applications of the unobserved components model,
such as the WGI, this restriction is not required because there are three or more data sources.
11. For details on this calculation, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004, 2006). Gelb,
Ngo, and Ye (2004) perform a similar calculation comparing the African Development Bank and
World Bank CPIA scores. Their conclusion that the CPIA ratings have little measurement error is
driven largely by the fact that the authors focus on the aggregate CPIA scores, which are very
highly correlated between the two institutions. The focus here is on one of 16 specific questions;
at this level of disaggregation, the correlation between the two sets of ratings is considerably
lower.
12. For example, virtually all of the individual indicators underlying the aggregate WGI are
available at www.govindicators.org.
13. One of the best-known and best-executed recent studies of this type is a study of corrup-
tion in a local road-building project by Olken (2007).
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